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Anthony House
History 232-01
Prof. Moran-Cruz
28 April 2000

The Fate of the Templars in Britain

The Templars have something to do with everything
-Umberto Eco, Foucault’s Pendulum

The Knights Templars—or, more precisely, the Knights of the Temple of Solomon of Jerusalem—enjoy a prominent position in the clouded collective memory of the western world. While the name elicits vacant expressions from most, the image of a knight in white tunic emblazoned with a red cross is immediately familiar. From its inception in 1118, the Temple grew steadily, eventually becoming the most powerful of the crusading orders. Though the Templars—along with the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights—ostensibly kept their focus outside Christendom, they exceeded the scope of their rival orders by assuming positions of power within Europe. While the Templars fought the Muslims in Palestine, they accumulated wealth and privilege in the West. Backed by the papacy and exempt from clerical taxes, the Templars’ fortune expanded through shrewd business practices. Their activity in Europe, of course, only augmented their aims in the Middle East, until 1291, at least. With the fall of Acre, though, the Crusades as such were over, and the Temple lost its raison d’être. Rather than drifting slowly into oblivion, the Templars shifted their focus, pouring the entirety of their vast resources into their European interests. The Temple’s leaders, who saw their order as superior to its rivals, dismissed a gradual unification of the military orders. Indeed, the Temple has been called "the single most wealthy and powerful institution in Christendom, with the sole exception of the Papacy;" its international financial status helped it wield significant power. (Baigent 43). The Templars fulfilled an integral role in Europe’s economy, as the principal bankers of the age. As such, they were not easily replaceable. They financed private enterprise and royal treasuries alike, for all practical purposes earning interest in the name of a Church that cautioned against the dangers of usury. Regardless of their wealth, however, within thirty years of their departure from the Holy Land, the Temple had been destroyed, its property plundered by rival orders and monarchs alike, and its legacy extinguished. Still, legend tells that the Temple survived in Scotland, at least for a time, and such a legend’s historical legitimacy cannot be completely dismissed.

Reconstructing the Templars’ history is no easy task. The Order’s internal documents were cryptic and scarce, even at the time of its suppression, and few survived the Temple’s persecution in the early fourteenth century. External contemporary sources such as the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle and government documents shed light on much of the Order’s history, but prove less helpful in understanding its final years. Records of the Temple’s wealth are piecemeal, varying immensely from state to state and even from county to county. Chroniclers’ reluctance to speak on the Templars’ behalf further complicates a complete understanding of their demise. The British Temple poses additional problems. Edward’s hesitance—coupled with Scotland’s simultaneous push for independence—further clouds the Order’s fate.

The Temple’s English interests commenced in 1128 with Hugh de Payens’ visit to Normandy, where Henry I "received him with much honour, and gave him rich presents in gold and in silver" before sending him thence to England and Scotland (Chronicle 1128). Whether a Templar installment was actually established with Hugh’s visit is unclear, though it seems probable. The first major land grants came during the contentious reign of King Stephen. Both he and his wife were exceedingly generous to the Temple, as were Stephen’s rivals to the throne. From 1135 on, "the rise of the Templars to power and wealth in England proceeded in a rapid fashion" (Parker 15). After securing his crown, Stephen conferred further wealth—and privileges—on the Temple. By the king’s death in 1154, the Templars had established themselves firmly in England. The British Temple built itself on the foundation laid by Stephen.

The British province was comparatively young and "less involved in the crusading movement" than continental provinces (Parker 17). Relatively free from the resource-draining military activities of the Order, the British Temple was free to focus on developing itself domestically. Most Templars joined the Order in the West and spent the majority of their careers there, often serving in the same house for long periods of time. There was, of course, lateral movement within each province, as the needs of various preceptories changed, but there "appears to have been limited mobility between provinces in the West" (Barber 203). The British Temple—less prone to circulate its members through service in the East—was able to focus its energies on its role in the Isles. The British Templars were, for the most part, free from the rest of the order to choose their own master or grand preceptor. Insular as the British Temple was, its members were wont to select a master on good terms with the crown, and "the possibility of royal appointment or intervention must be considered," despite little evidence to support such a notion (Parker 18). The preceptors of Ireland and Scotland, often miscalled masters of their respective regions, were in reality subordinates of the master at London. At lower levels of administration, the Order was served by procurators—the Order’s business agents and lawyers—and by a large number of clerics (Parker 19). In aggregate, the Temple’s administrative layers functioned to gain substantial wealth for the Order.

The British province of the Knights Templar accumulated wealth through commercial, financial, and agricultural activities. This approach required, more than anything, the favor of the crown, and the Templars’ privileges in England attest to their elevated status. Perhaps most importantly, the Temple was exempt from almost all secular taxes and tolls: including the Danegeld, highway tolls, and levies on movable property, among others (Forey 114). Such exemptions freed the Templars from the burdens that accompanied wealth for many other sectors of society. In the medieval marketplace, the Order was at a marked advantage, since it could offer "wool, grain, and cash to the foreign merchants, and grain, fish, and livestock" to locals, while avoiding resource-draining fees and tolls (Parker 55). In England, the Templars’ most widely traded commodities were wool and wine, which the Order sold to both royal agents and foreign merchants. .

In addition to their commercial activities, the Templars were deeply involved in the financial activities of Christendom. During an era in which the Church was beginning to accept usury as a necessity of business, the Templars charged interest through a variety of methods, some more overt than others (Forey 118). "The role of Jewish money-lenders is minor compared to that of the Temple," which—in addition to loans—included the transfer of funds, execution of trusts, the use credit instruments, and its availability as a royal treasury (Baigent 47). Popular memory, however, has all but forgotten this role of the Order, focusing instead on Jews and Italian merchants, though the foremost bankers of Christendom at the time were indeed the Knights Templars. They "handled much, if not most of the available capital in Western Europe" (Seward 213). Their experience with financial administration endeared them further to both kings and popes, who sought to improve revenue from taxation (Barber, New Knighthood 267). The expertise that seemed to accompany the successful handling of the Temple’s vast wealth was as desirable to borrowers as the funds themselves, and the Order maintained an immaculate reputation throughout Europe for its honesty in financial transactions. The sound economic footing of the Templars, both commercially and financially, would have been impossible without the Temple’s extensive lands in Britain. Though it received much of its property from royal or noble grants, the Order also invested "surplus revenues in a way which would bring long-term profit" (Forey 109). Rent income from properties in the British province is difficult to estimate since no comprehensive list of lands held by the Order remains, if indeed such records ever existed. Specific figures noting the income of the Temple at various times and in various areas are all that remain. An Inquest of Templar holdings, conducted in 1185, reports that their land, mills, and churches in some (though by no means all) counties pulled in an annual income of £857 (Parker 51). As perspective, the Pipe Roll of 1191 records that "£25 was paid to two men belonging to Winchelsea and Hastings respectively for their ships bought by the king at la Rochelle" (Stenton xiii, 58). Suffice to say, then, that the British Templars were blessed with substantial financial resources from their agricultural interests

Despite its administrative center at London, "it was in Yorkshire that the most extensive of the English property was situated" (Martin, Yorkshire 366). Whereas the Templars in London pursued financial aims, the Yorkshire preceptories focused on the Order’s agricultural functions. When royal officials audited the wealth of the Temple in 1308, the property-based income of the Order in Yorkshire—£1,130—accounts for more than a quarter of the provincial total of £ 4,351 (Parker 51). The 1308 survey encompassed a greater portion of the province’s wealth. The additional income since 1185 was also a result of increases in property held by the Order and the expansion and maturation of its financial activities. Even in Yorkshire, however, "no monument of the Order remains" besides a few scattered place-names (Martin, Yorkshire 367). In fact, it is merely "the constant recurrence of the name of the Order in the charters and deeds of two hundred years that survives as the principal witness to the their importance" (377). The Temple’s holdings to the north were significantly less numerable. There were perhaps four houses belonging to the Order in Scotland at the end of the thirteenth century, employing fewer than twenty Templars (Barber, New Knighthood 252). Still, Scotland’s preceptor was among the most important administrators of the province, since his authority extended over all Templar properties within Scotland, and the otherwise significant concentration of Templar resources on the north end of the island cannot be disregarded when considering the suppression of the Order.

The persecution of the Knights Templars, though the brainchild of Philip the Fair’s jealousy and greed, depended on the consent of the papacy. He fought ruthlessly to destroy the Temple, and his domination of the papacy had strong historical antecedents. The election of Peter Morrone, a Sicilian ascetic, as Celestine V in 1293 marked the triumph of French interests over those of feuding Italian clans in the Holy See. Celestine disgusted the cardinals with his "eccentricities, ineptitude, and subservience to Charles of Naples, who practically held him in captivity" (Bokenkotter 158). Charles of Naples was son of Charles of Anjou, and under his influence, the newly crowned Pope added thirteen cardinals to the college, including seven Frenchmen and three Neapolitans. Nearly half the cardinals were now French and "took their orders from Charles," and when Benedetto Gaetani—who waged a war of propaganda against the incompetent Pope—caught his eye, Celestine was quick to resign (Campbell 221). Gaetani, however, proved to be a poor choice of allies. After procuring the episcopacy for himself, Boniface VIII, he refused to submit to any temporal authority, particularly that of Philip, King of France. Their battle for dominance, exceptionally bitter, culminated in Philip’s attempt to kidnap the pontiff. Though unsuccessful, the aged Boniface died within a month of the incident. According to legend, the king had him poisoned.

"Whether or not Philip was responsible for Benedict’s death, the vacancy in the Holy See at this time suited the king’s plans nicely" (Campbell 231). With his opposition dead, Philip set out to find a pope who would bend to his ambitions. After the rapid election and death of Boniface’s successor, the cardinals came to a deadlock. Without France’s support, the election of another pope proved impossible. Eventually, Philip settled on Bernard de Goth, the Archbishop of Bordeaux. The king’s support, however, was contingent on the Bernard’s agreeing to six conditions set forth by the king of France, including one unspecified favor. What favor Philip wanted has "remained a mystery to this day, but it is possible that the king had in mind the suppression of the Templars" (Campbell 232). His assent gained him the tiara, and he was crowned Clement V at Lyons. The king quickly pushed for the relocation of the Holy See, his case bolstered by unrest in Rome, and by 1305 the Pope was within reach of Philip’s court. With the papacy in his clutches, Philip was ready to pursue his attack on the Knights Templars.

Philip’s enmity for the Order of the Temple had its roots in both personal and political frustrations. The Templars had refused his request for honorary membership—similar to that granted Richard I of England. Though this can hardly explain such a vicious vendetta against the organization, Philip took the Order’s rejection as a personal affront. More importantly, however, Philip was "always in want of money" and in the midst a large-scale battle against the Papacy (Campbell 237). The destruction of the Templars alleviated both of these problems. He had seen the vast treasury of the Order during a visit to the Paris Temple, and an opportunity to seize its extensive French property must have had substantial appeal. Additionally, the military orders, including the Templars, the Hospitallers, and the Teutonic Knights, were essentially the Pope’s army, and in his struggle to subdue the Church, undermining papal military power furthered his cause. Philip saw his move as not strictly offensive, however; he maintained a paranoid notion that the Templars planned to establish a continental state carved from France. "He could endure no rival in France," though, and the end of the Order would secure his reign, both financially and politically (242). Church cooperation was necessary, however, if the king wished to confiscate the wealth of the Temple in France, for "the Templars were an ecclesiastical society outside the reach of the civil courts, and they were spread over the whole of Europe" (Martin, Trial 33). Philip’s ambitions were facilitated by more widespread discontent with the Order in France. Critics pointed out the Order’s greed and powerful status, and suggested reforms ranging from seizure of Templar holdings for educational use to an amalgamation of the Templars with the Hospitallers. The papacy, of course, had also suggested the latter, which was summarily dismissed by the Templars. Finally, on 13 October 1307, officers of Philip the Fair arrested Templars throughout his France, and Philip began a war of propaganda against the Order throughout Christendom.

The Temple’s suppression in England was less zealous; the king was outwardly reluctant to partake in the pillage. Edward II, Philip’s son-in-law, "protested strongly and dismissed the accusations as fanatical" (Campbell 269). In a letter to the kings of Portugal, Castile, Aragon and Sicily, he represents the French king’s claims as "animated…not with the zeal of rectitude, but with a spirit of cupidity and envy" (Edward qtd. in Addison 206). Edward’s observation is, in hindsight, extremely perceptive. Unfortunately, Philip had the backing of the pontiff. Clement’s need to appease Philip forced him to choose between protecting the Temple and remaining loyal to his predecessor Boniface. Edward’s subsequent appeal to the pope, in which he represents the Templars as "universally respected by all men in his dominions for the purity of their faith and morals," fell, predictably, on deaf ears (Addison 207). Edward was therefore induced to bend to the pope’s (and Philip’s) will, and the king ordered the arrest of the English Templars on 8 January 1308.

Even after their arrest, however, the Templars under Edward’s jurisdiction faired better than their continental comrades. Generally, the Order was better thought-of in the British province, and Edward did not share his father-in-law’s antipathy for the Temple. More importantly, the system of justice in England was less coercive and brutal than that of France: "Preliminary examination of the English Templars lasted until November 17th [1308] and produced not a scrap of real evidence" against the order (Campbell 283). The English failure to extract confessions was no surprise, since the use of torture was neither extensive nor effective in the interrogations. Nevertheless, Edward’s lack of success angered both Philip and Clement, who feared the collapse of their case against the order. Under these circumstances, the papacy sent legates to England to proceed with the interrogations. Edward complied with Clement’s wishes, again reluctantly. He wrote to the archbishop of Canterbury and the bishops of Lincoln and London, asking that they "be personally present with the papal inquisitors, as often as such inquisitors, or any one of them, should proceed with their inquiries against the Templars" (Addison 212). Clement’s representatives had somewhat more success. Campbell, however, suggests that, "had the investigations made elsewhere been as barren, even a Pope so much in the toils of the most unscrupulous prince in Christendom as Clement V would have been incapable of taking any action against the Temple" (290). Luckily for Philip, though, Templars in other provinces echoed the admissions made by those in France, though the methods used to extract such confessions were questionable. As in France, Templars on the Iberian Peninsula, and to a lesser extent in the Holy Roman Empire, were tortured. Some were shown forged letters from Jacques De Molay, the Grand Master of the Order, "exhorting them to confess themselves guilty," and many did (Addison 205). The failure of the English inquisition was the weak point in the Order’s suppression, and that failure was further exaggerated in Scotland.

Truly, in 1308, Edward was in no position to order Scotland to do anything. In the midst of the Scottish Wars of Independence, the English king’s ability to enforce his decrees was directly related to the extent of his military presence in the north. Robert Bruce had defied Edward I in 1306 by becoming King of Scotland (Barron 442). Though Robert subsequently suffered defeat and exile in the same year after a battle at Methven. Robert returned to fight, however, in 1307, and the unrest between the two states continued for nearly six years. During this period of repudiated authority Edward ordered, in accordance with Clement’s wishes, "all the Templars in his dominions to be taken into custody" (Addison 208). John de Richemund, the guardian of Scotland, was therefore relatively powerless to carry out Edward’s commands. If Scottish resistance to Edward aided the Scottish Templars, however, it harmed those in England, for the king, occupied "with his campaign in Scotland, cooperated so that the third phase of the examination at London…was conducted more in accord with papal wishes" (Parker 95). Further complicating the suppression of the Scottish Temple was Bruce’s contentious relationship with the papacy itself. In 1306, Bruce killed his rival John Comyn in Greyfriars’ church, Dumfries. "Comyn’s murder seems to have signaled a repudiation of the Papacy," and Bruce was soon excommunicated for the act (Baigent 30). Though Robert’s decisive victory at Bannockburn remained nearly a decade ahead, and the English did not recognize him as king until 1328, Robert was firmly in control of Scotland.

With little incentive to comply with the demands of England or the papacy, Robert Bruce carried out a decidedly half-hearted campaign against the Templars in his realm. Indeed, there is little evidence of any activity that could even be called persecution: "only two interrogatories of Templars have been found, in neither of which is any crime admitted" (Martin, Trial 60). While forty-one outside witnesses were heard, none provided significant evidence against the Order. As in England, the Templars of Scotland were "aided by a popular attitude not nearly so hostile as that in France" (Parker 91). Many other nations in Western Europe, of course, treated Templars less harshly than France. Those countries, however, still complied with the pontiff’s wishes enough to suppress the Temple in some form. In Lorraine, for example, the Order blended into the general public with little ado, and in Portugal the Order remained intact for all practical purposes, though they renamed themselves the Knights of Christ (Baigent 55). In Scotland, on the other hand, Clement’s orders were all but ignored. No further arrests were made after the release of the Templars examined, and "King Robert never ratified the Scottish Temple’s dissolution" (Seward 205). It has been suggested that "fugitives from the continent, along with their English and Irish brethren, would have gravitated northwards—where, beyond the reach of both the Papacy and the Inquisition, they could expect immunity" (Baigent 69). Robert’s ambivalence would have undoubtedly appealed to those Templars throughout Christendom seeking refuge.

Besides the presence of the Temple in Scotland, even after its suppression elsewhere, there are other historical links between the Templars and Bruce’s struggle for Scotland’s independence. Members of the English Temple "rendered military service to Edward I in his campaign against Scotland," which began in 1298 (Parker 48). In fact, Brian de Jay—Master of the British Temple—was killed in the crucial battle at Falkirk. That battle also witnessed the future King Robert’s father at the side of Edward I, helping to subdue the rebellious Scots (Young 181). Surely, Robert would have realized the advantages gained by including Templars in a national military. By 1308, when Edward II began his persecution of the British Temple, Robert was in need of a strong military to fight off the English. This need may well have influenced Robert’s reluctance to actively persecute the Order in Scotland. No records specifically mention an influx of Templars, but gaps in history provide enough meat for legends.

The Wars of Independence culminated in June 1314 with the battle of Bannockburn. The decisive Scotch victory essentially ended Edward’s hopes of bringing Scotland under English authority. Though even the precise location of the battle remains the subject of significant debate, there are contemporary narrative accounts of the battle. John Barbour, Robert Bruce’s first biographer, describes the tactic that earned the Scots their victory in the second day of fierce battle: "They then took sheets both broad and tall, / And fastened them with pole and spear / That they like banners might appear" (Barbour 305). The English, seeing the banners, scattered, and Robert’s forces had little trouble dominating the Edward’s splintered troops. The decisive moment, the "intervention of what the English regarded as a ‘fresh force,’ which suddenly erupted with banners flying from the Scottish rear" is downright shocking (Baigent 35). How could a force as great as Edward’s suddenly lose its nerve with so little motivation?

Certainly, no contemporary chronicle suggests the presence of Templars in the battle. This does not necessarily mean that Knights of the Order had no part in the fight. No contemporary English source details that nation’s shameful defeat; England tried to forget the battle ever occurred. Scottish chroniclers, on the other hand, would have had other motivations for leaving the Temple out of Bannockburn. Even discounting his desire to look independently strong, Bruce needed to regain the favor of the papacy, and harboring ecclesiastical refugees could have only antagonized reconciliation. Nevertheless, "the prospect of as many as ninety-three trained Templars at large in Britain was not to be dismissed" (Baigent 62). Refugee Templars "may well have found refuge with the Bruce’s guerillas" (Seward 205). Bruce did, in fact, reward Angus Óg MacDonald with substantial tracts of property soon after the battle, presumably for his troops’ integral role in defeating the British, and "any Templars settled in that region would, as a matter of course, have fought under the nominal command of Angus Óg" (Baigent 37). A group of Templars entering late in the second day of battle, under their own banner, could certainly have destroyed the morale of the English. Perhaps even sending them into flight. While it remains a convenient explanation, though, a Templar presence at Bannockburn cannot be proven.

The prospect of Templars helping Scotland gain its independence is both romantic and elusive, the perfect fodder for legend. The legends predate the information revolution, though the Internet has fostered their spread, no doubt. They feed on what Umberto Eco describes as credulity: "if two things don’t fit, but you believe both of them, thinking that somewhere, hidden, there must be a third thing that connects them" (Eco 49). Certainly, legends that connect the Scots to the Order are widespread. Printed material is ripe with suggestions of asylum. Addison mentions in passing that many Templars "escaped in disguise to the wild and mountainous parts of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland" (Addison 213). Foucalt’s Pendulum recognizes the widespread notion that "the Templars fled to Scotland," and The Temple and the Lodge goes so far as to suggest that vast Templar riches, which disappeared from France, were shipped from the Siene through Galway and Limerick to Argyll, Scotland (Eco 375, Baigent 71). The Internet expands on the legends, explaining the Temple’s presence in Scotland as a matter of fact. The web page of the Militi Templi Scotia, for example, states that "under its excuminicated [sic] King, Robert the Bruce, the Nation [provided] a ‘safe-haven’ for fugitive Templars" (Militi Templi Scotia 1312). The page restates the legend that "fugitive Templars fought at Bruce's side at Bannockburn on the 24th June, Midsummer's day, the Feast day of John the Baptist," and proceeds to claim that "Bruce [created] the Order of Heredom as a mark of appreciation to the Templar Knights" (1314). Some contend that the Order of Heredom is at the root of the Masonic tradition. Other articles suggest that the paucity of information about the Scottish Temple is a result of England’s eventual dominance over the Scots, and presume to define the terms that under which the Temple found refuge in Scotland: "King Robert… offered them sanctuary in return for support in his struggle with England" (Clayton). The widespread acceptance of Scottish Temple legends cannot overcome the complete absence of supporting evidence, though, and speculation—even when based in solid logic—cannot prove itself alone.

There is little doubt that some Templars did indeed flee to Scotland. The large number of Knights based in Yorkshire, coupled with Scotland’s lax enforcement of the papacy’s inquisition, strongly suggests that some of the unaccounted-for Templars fled north to Bruce’s kingdom. Even had a significant number of Knights found refuge in Scotland, though, there is no evidence to suggest they retained their collective identity as members of the defunct Order. Certainly, some contemporary chronicle would have made mention of a Templar stronghold, had it existed. Eventually, memory of the Temple’s name faded. Nevertheless, its legacy continues even today. Whether for the mass-market of Indiana Jones or the more restricted audience of Umberto Eco, modern culture still recalls the most celebrated and revered of the military orders. Neo-Templaric organizations, among them the Freemasons and the Militi Templi Scotia, thrive throughout the world. Popular culture continues to romanticize the crusaders, if not the Templars per se. Truly, though its institution may have disappeared, the Temple remains an integral part of the western world’s sense of self.

Works Cited

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Baigent, Michael and Richard Leigh. The Temple and the Lodge. New York: Arcade P, 1993.

Barber, Malcolm, ed. The Military Orders: Fighting for the Faith and Caring for the Sick. London: Cambridge U P, 1994.

Barber, Malcolm. The New Knighthood: A History of the Order of the Temple. London: Cambridge U P, 1994.

Barbour, John. The Bruce, being the Metrical History of Robert the Bruce, King of Scots. Eyre-Todd, George, trans. London: Gowans & Gray, 1907.

Barron, Evan M. The Scottish War of Independence: A Critical Study. London: J. Nisbet, 1914.

Bokenkotter, Thomas. A Concise History of the Catholic Church. New York: Doubleday, 1990.

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Stenton, Doris, ed. The Great Rolls of the Pipe of the Third and Fourth Years of the Reign of King Richard the First. London: Ruddock and Sons, 1926.

Eco, Umberto. Foucault’s Pendulum. Weaver, William, trans. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989.

Forey, Alan. The Military Orders from the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1992.

Killings, Douglas B., ed. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. 1996. <http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/OMACL/Anglo/> (2 April 2000).

Martin, Edward J. "The Templars in Yorkshire." The Yorkshire Archaeological Journal. vol. xxix (1929).

Martin, Edward J. The Trial of the Templars. London: Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1978.

Militi Templi Scotia. Abridged Templar History in Scotland. 1999. <http://homepages.enterprise.net/paulmagoo/> (1 April 2000).

Parker, Thomas M. The Knights Templars in England. Tucson: U of Arizona P, 1963.

Seward, Desmond. The Monks of War: The Military Religious Orders. London: Eyre Methuen, 1972.